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Abstract: We analyze two recently documented follow-on purchase and 
repurchase patterns experimentally: Individual investors’ preference for purchas-
ing additional shares of a stock that decreased rather than increased in value suc-
ceeding an initial purchase (pattern 1) and investors’ tendency for purchasing 
stocks that they previously sold at a higher price (pattern 2). Similar to the field 
data study by Odean, Strahilevitz, and Barber (2004), subjects in our experiment 
are about 2.5 to 3 times as likely to purchase units of a single fictitious good if the 
price of the good declined following a purchase or sale in the previous period. As 
an assignment of choices clearly reduces the effect, we argue that investors are in-
volved in counterfactual thinking: They refrain from purchasing additional shares 
or repurchasing shares at a higher price because doing so means admitting to their 
ex post wrong decision. 
JEL code: C91, D14, D81, G11 
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Individual investors do not tend to behave as normative theory would suggest. They do 
not hold well-diversified portfolios and do not always trade in a direction to increase their 
portfolio diversification. (See e.g. Blume and Friend 1975, Glaser 2003, and Goetzmann and 
Kumar 2005 for empirical evidence as well as Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport 1988 and Bossaerts, 
Plott, and Zame 2006 for experimental evidence.) Nevertheless, for some reason, investors 
trade excessively, thus reducing their portfolio returns (Odean 1999). Examining individual-
level trading behavior reveals transaction patterns that cannot easily be explained by rational 
decision making. Examples for such patterns are attention-based buying on the purchase side 
(Barber and Odean 2006) and the disposition effect on the sales side (Odean 1998, Weber and 
Camerer 1998, Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001).
2
Not only initial purchase and selling decisions seem to be biased. As recently shown 
empirically by Odean, Strahilevitz, and Barber (2004), individual investors also exhibit a ten-
dency to base their follow-on purchases and repurchases on past experiences with the stock, 
which, from a normative point of view, should not affect (or, by changing total wealth only 
marginally affect) transactions today. Odean et al. (2004) document that stock purchases oc-
cur more often if the stock decreased in value subsequent to a prior purchase (pattern 1), or a 
prior sale (pattern 2), or if the stock was previously sold at a gain rather than at a loss (pattern 
3).  
From a normative point of view, follow-on purchases and repurchases should be of 
low interest, as investors have the opportunity to select their assets from a comprehensive 
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 1   universe of stocks, derivatives, bonds, and structured financial products. If investors were 
aware of all investment opportunities, they should only rarely consider purchasing additional 
shares of a stock they already own or stocks they previously sold. However, as important na-
tional and international indices are composed of only a small number of (blue chip) stocks, 
investors focusing on these stocks are naturally engaged with follow-on purchase and repur-
chase decisions over years. Investigating how investors react to these situations is thus an im-
portant task, if we want to come to a better understanding of general investment decision be-
havior and want to develop better market models. 
We investigate transaction patterns 1 and 2 experimentally. While field data studies 
like that of Odean, Strahilevitz, and Barber (2004) are concerned with the population we want 
to study, i.e. individual investors, they naturally fail to reveal whether certain behavior is 
driven by biased expectations or biased preferences. Our experiment allows us to replicate the 
behavior described above in a more controllable environment and gives us the opportunity to 
test different explanations. We conduct an individual choice experiment with 145 students, 
most of them majoring in economics or business administration. The experiment consists of 
four successive periods in which our subjects can buy and sell units of a single good. The 
price of the good changes every period. Based on our experimental data we are able to repli-
cate patterns 1 and 2: Our subjects prefer purchasing units of the single good if, subsequent to 
a prior purchase or sale, the good decreased rather than increased in value. 
Odean, Strahilevitz, and Barber (2004) attribute these biased transaction patterns to the 
psychological concept of “counterfactual thinking”: Decision makers tend to create mental 
simulations of “what might have been” if they decided differently in the past or if certain 
events in the past did not happen or happened differently. If this mental simulation, the coun-
terfactual, would have lead to a better outcome, decision makers shy away from actions that 
  
 2   would make their counterfactual more salient. For example, if an investor sold a stock for a 
low price and, succeeding the sale, the stock went up in value, he does not wish to repurchase 
the stock, because repurchasing would mean admitting that his prior decision to sell the stock 
was ex post a wrong one. Similarly, if the investor purchased a stock for a low price, he is 
likely to refrain from purchasing additional shares at a higher price, because this repurchase 
would confront him with a counterfactual in which he made a larger initial purchase. 
Counterfactuals are reported to be affected by antecedent controllability (Kahneman 
and Miller 1986, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo 1991, Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and 
McMullen 1995, Roese and Olson 1995a), which, in turn, depends on whether the decision 
maker decided freely or not in the past. Hence, we control for counterfactual thinking in two 
further treatments, in which we assign our subjects the number of units to purchase and sell in 
the first two periods of the experiment. An assignment of choices clearly reduces the effect: 
While subjects in the assigned-choice treatments purchase as often as in the standard treat-
ment following a price decrease, succeeding a price increase, their purchase frequency is 
about two times as high if the prior purchase or selling decision was assigned. Consistent with 
the psychological literature (Roese and Olson 1995a and Roese 1997), we thus find that espe-
cially upward counterfactuals exhibit a strong impact on investment decisions. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we first review related literature on in-
dividual investors’ trading patterns, focusing on follow-on purchase and repurchase decisions. 
We then summarize possible explanations for investors’ purchase behavior and derive our 
hypotheses. In section 3, we explain the experimental design and procedure. Section 4 pre-
sents our results, and section 5 draws conclusions. Translations of the experimental instruc-
tions and questionnaires can be found in the appendix. 
 
  
 3   2  Related Literature, Competing Explanations, and Hypotheses 
Recent research documents that individual investors’ purchasing and selling decisions 
strongly deviate from normative behavior. One of the best investigated biases in behavioral 
finance is the disposition effect. As first noted by Shefrin and Statman (1985), individual in-
vestors more readily sell stocks at a gain rather than at a loss. (See e.g. Odean 1998, Weber 
and Camerer 1998, and Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001 for evidence.) The most common ex-
planation for this behavior is based on prospect theory’s s-shaped value function (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) in combination with mental accounting 
(Thaler 1980, 1985), assuming some weighted average of the stock’s past purchase prices as 
the reference point. On the other hand, when looking for a purchase opportunity, investment 
decisions are affected by individual investors’ inability to follow all stocks in the market. In-
dividual investors looking for a stock to purchase have to limit their choice set to only the 
small selection of stocks of which they are aware, e.g. stocks that recently garnered their at-
tention. Lee (1992) and Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, and Teoh (2003) find that individual in-
vestors are net buyers following both negative and positive earnings surprises. Barber and 
Odean (2006) provide further evidence of so-called attention-based buying using trading vol-
ume, extreme one day returns, and news as proxies for attention grabbing events. 
Much less is known about individual investors’ follow-on purchase and repurchase be-
havior. The only direct investigation comes from Odean, Strahilevitz, and Barber (2004). The 
authors analyze two U.S. data sets covering 66,465 individual investors with accounts at a 
large discount broker and 665,533 individual investors with accounts at a large retail broker. 
The data sets contain transactions from January 1991 through December 1996 and January 
1997 through June 1999, respectively. Odean, Strahilevitz, and Barber discover three previ-
ously undocumented patterns in investors’ purchasing decisions. Investors seem to prefer  
  
 4   •  purchasing additional shares of stocks that decreased rather than increased in value subse-
quent to a prior purchase (pattern 1), 
•  repurchasing stocks that lost value rather than increased in value subsequent to a prior sale 
(pattern 2), and 
•  repurchasing stocks they previously sold at a profit rather than stocks they previously sold 
at a loss (pattern 3). 
In our experiment, we investigate the first two patterns in detail.
3 In the experiment we 
are able to control for alternative explanations that cannot be controlled for with field data. 
We also apply different treatment groups to shed some light on why people exhibit this be-
havior. 
The follow-on purchase and repurchase patterns found in individual investors’ trading 
behavior could be explained in different ways. Investors possessing superior private informa-
tion could sell overpriced stocks and later repurchase these stocks at or below fundamental 
value, consistent with pattern 2. Alternatively, investors might believe in mean reverting stock 
prices and purchase stocks that recently decreased in value because they expect these stocks 
to rebound to the old price. We use the advantage of a controlled laboratory experiment to 
create conditions where neither of these explanations apply: Our experiment can be described 
as a simple multi-stage lottery framed as a single good market. Our subjects are not provided 
with superior information about this good, and, as the probabilities of the multi-stage lottery 
are constant over all periods, any belief in mean reversion becomes obviously irrational. The 
                                                 
3   We refrain from testing pattern 3, as subjects in our experiment rarely sell at a loss. 
  
 5   remaining behavioral explanations we want to discuss in the following are based on standard 
prospect theory and counterfactual thinking. 
We start with pattern 1, i.e. investors’ attitude for purchasing additional shares if the 
stock recently decreased in value. Prospect theory is consistent with this behavior as it pre-
dicts that the investor becomes risk seeking and more willing to escalate his commitment if he 
had previously incurred a loss. Purchasing additional shares of a stock at a lower price de-
creases the average purchase price, increases the probability of breaking even, and probably 
lowers the investor’s reference point. To some extent, the same explanation applies to pattern 
2, i.e. investors’ preference for repurchasing stocks that decreased in value subsequent to a 
previous sale. If the investor did not sell all shares in the past, some (unrealized) gains and 
losses remain in his mental account. If the stock drops in value after the sale, the investor’s 
mental account is more likely to contain an unrealized loss as opposed to if the stock had in-
creased in value. Thus, investors should repurchase shares more often following price de-
creases. However, if an investor sold all shares in the past and closed his mental account, 
there should be no difference between the two cases. 
Although patterns 1 and 2 are at least partly explained by standard prospect theory, 
Odean et al. (2004) attribute the above discussed transaction patterns to the psychological 
concept of “counterfactual thinking” (Kahneman and Tversky 1982, Kahneman and Miller 
1986). The term counterfactual thinking refers to people’s natural tendency to create mental 
simulations of “what might have been” had a certain event in the past not happened, or had 
they themselves made a different decision (see Kahneman 1995, Roese and Olson 1995b, and 
Roese 1997 for overviews of the literature). Counterfactual thinking is assumed to be impor-
tant for everyday life and enables people to learn from their prior mistakes. If a person com-
pares a situation he is actually in with some counterfactual, the comparison evokes feelings of 
  
 6   joy or regret, depending on whether the counterfactual would have lead to a worse (downward 
counterfactual) or better (upward counterfactual) outcome. These feelings, in turn, interfere 
with subsequent behavior. For example, a decision maker might think counterfactually if he 
decided to participate in a lottery that led to a negative payout. A reasonable counterfactual 
would be to compare this loss situation to a mental simulation in which the decision maker 
refrained from playing the lottery. Note that counterfactual thinking and prospect theory are 
not necessarily conflicting explanations, as counterfactuals could also be interpreted as possi-
ble candidates for prospect theory’s reference point (see Weber and Welfens 2007). However, 
counterfactual thinking emphasizes that not only real gains and losses but also hypothetical or 
missed gains and losses are important for the decision maker’s subsequent behavior. 
Imagine an investor who purchased a stock in the past and now has to decide on 
whether to purchase more shares of the same stock (the situation considered in pattern 1). The 
investor is likely to compare his current situation with the situation he could have been in had 
he made a larger initial purchase. If this comparison makes him feel good, i.e. if since the ini-
tial purchase the stock price has declined (downward counterfactual), he is more likely to pur-
chase additional shares. If, instead, the stock price has increased (upward counterfactual) he is 
aware that he could have been better off by simply purchasing more shares at the time of the 
initial purchase. The investor may avoid further purchases to forget about this counterfactual. 
Pattern 2 may be explained in a similar way: An investor who sold a stock in the past 
and now needs to decide on whether to repurchase this stock is likely to create a mental 
simulation in which he simply did not sell the stock. Consequently, he might compare his 
actual situation with two different counterfactuals: If, since selling the stock, the price has 
declined (downward counterfactual), reality prevails over the mental simulation; the investor 
is glad to have sold the stock, because he can now repurchase it at a lower price. He may 
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think about the avoided loss as a gain. Instead, if the stock price has increased after the sale the avoided loss as a gain. Instead, if the stock price has increased after the sale (upward 
counterfactual), the investor is sad about his ex post wrong decision. To avoid a feeling of 
regret, the investor tries to avoid paying attention to a stock that has increased in value since 
he sold it. He is less likely to repurchase the stock, because repurchasing makes his counter-
factual more salient. Counterfactual thinking can thus explain pattern 2, even if the investor 
decided to sell all shares in the past. 
In our experimental study we first try to replicate the findings of Odean, Strahilevitz, 
and Barber (2004) leading to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis  1:  (Pattern 1) Individual investors are more likely to purchase additional 
shares of a stock if this stock has lost value rather than increased in value 
since the initial purchase. 
Hypothesis 2:  (Pattern 2) Individual investors are more likely to repurchase a previously 
sold stock if this stock has lost value rather than increased in value since 
being sold. 
In addition, we want to test whether patterns 1 and 2 are solely driven by changes in 
risk aversion following gains and losses, i.e. prospect theory, or whether counterfactual think-
ing (and thus hypothetical gains and losses) can add something to understanding this behav-
ior. To test for counterfactual thinking, we apply the following mechanism: As known from 
psychological research, controllable and thus mentally mutable antecedents tend to create 
more counterfactual thoughts than uncontrollable antecedents. (See Kahneman and Miller 
1986 for theory, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo 1991, Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and 
McMullen 1995, and Roese and Olson 1995a for evidence and McMullen, Markman, and 
Gavanski 1995 for discussion.) Hence, decision makers that are personally responsible for an 
  
 8   ex-post wrong decision should feel more regret and be more affected in their follow up deci-
sions. In our experiment, we vary antecedent controllability by assigning prior purchases and 
sales to two treatment groups. If the follow-on purchase and repurchase patterns described 
above are due to counterfactual thinking, we expect them to be more salient if the investor 
decided freely on the prior purchase or the prior sale. We expect them to be weaker if the de-
cision to purchase or sell the stock was assigned by the experimenter. This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3:  (Evidence of counterfactual thinking as an explanation for pattern 1) The 
follow-on purchase pattern described by hypothesis 1 is stronger if the in-
vestor decided freely on the initial purchase and weaker if the initial pur-
chase was assigned. 
Hypothesis 4:  (Evidence of counterfactual thinking as an explanation for pattern 2) The 
repurchase pattern described by hypothesis 2 is stronger if the investor de-
cided freely on the prior sale and weaker if the prior sale was assigned. 
 
3  Experimental Design  
Studying follow-on purchases and repurchases means investigating the second and 
third step of a decision sequence concerning the same stock. In our experiment, we capture 
these decision sequences with a four-period design. 
3.1  Basic Design  
We apply an experimental design similar to Weber and Zuchel (2005). Weber and 
Zuchel study how decision makers are affected by gains and losses under different choice 
  
 9   frames. They set up a three period individual choice experiment, in which subjects could buy 
and sell units of a fictitious asset (in an asset frame) or purchase lottery tickets (in a lottery 
frame). In the asset frame, prices of the fictitious asset change from period to period. Subjects 
need to decide how many units to purchase and sell in periods 1 and 2 while the purpose of 
period 3 is only to determine the final value of the asset. We stick to the asset frame and ex-
tend the experimental design to four periods so that our subjects now need to make three deci-
sions in a row. 
Our experiment therefore consists of three successive decision periods labeled period 
1 to 3, with a fourth period determining final wealth and payout. In period 1, subjects are en-
dowed with € 12, which they can use to purchase up to 40 units of a single good
4. Subjects 
retain all money not used for purchasing units. In periods 2 and 3 subjects can either purchase 
(additional) units of the single good or sell units they bought in previous periods, getting back 
the current price in Euros. They can also decide to do nothing and keep their number of units 
constant. The only constraints on our subjects’ decisions are that their individual money ac-
count as well as their number of units held have to remain non-negative. In contrast to Weber 
and Zuchel (2005), our subjects do not receive additional money over periods and are not al-
lowed to buy on credit. We eliminate both design properties to ensure that results are not 
driven by subjects’ unwillingness to purchase on debt. 
After each decision, the unit price changes: Starting at 30 cents in period 1, the price 
either increases by 12 cents or decreases by 10 cents from period to period. Price increases 
and decreases are equally likely and are independent of previous price changes. Our subjects 
                                                 
4   We use the German terms “Einheiten” (“units”) and “Gut” (“good”) rather than “shares” and “stock” to avoid 
framing effects. 
  
 10   are informed about these probabilities and corresponding future prices of the good. The event 
tree in figure 1 shows all possible price developments. 
(please insert figure 1 about here) 
 
From a normative point of view, our subjects are confronted with three successive lot-
teries in which they need to decide how much money to bet. Holding a number of x units of 
the good for one period means participating in a lottery which either results in a gain of 12 
cents times x or a loss of 10 cents times x, with both outcomes being equally likely. The lot-
tery leads to an expected payoff of x cents, but also increases in risk with the number of units 
held. While a risk neutral subject should purchase the maximum number of 40 units in period 
1 and hold these units throughout the experiment, a risk averse subject might purchase fewer 
units. Ignoring income effects, subjects should not change their exposure to risk over periods 
and should neither purchase nor sell units of the single good in periods 2 and 3. Decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, on the other hand, makes a subject more willing to purchase additional 
units following a price increase and to sell units succeeding a price decrease – the opposite of 
what we expect by our hypotheses.
5
We ask our subjects for their complete strategy using Selten’s (1967) strategy method. 
This method, commonly used in game theory experiments, demands subjects to devise strate-
gies for each of their opponents’ possible moves. In our experiment we ask our subjects to 
decide how many units to buy or sell at each node of the first three periods of the event tree 
(nodes 1 to 7 in figure 1). Decisions in later periods are always based on those from prior pe-
                                                 
5   Note that holding portfolio weights constant as proposed by portfolio theory in combination with constant 
relative risk aversion is not a normative strategy in our experiment. The substitution effect only arises if 
absolute price changes depend on current price levels, i.e. if relative price changes were constant. Instead, in 
our experiment, price changes are fixed in absolute terms. The amount of money a subject puts at risk is thus 
only a function of how many units the subject holds, not a function of current prices. 
  
 11   riods. For example: We first ask a subject how many units of the single good he wants to buy 
in period 1 (node 1). Afterwards (in period 2) we ask him how many units he wants to buy or 
sell if the unit price has either increased to 42 cents (node 2) or decreased to 20 cents (node 
3). The number of units he can sell in period 2 is limited by the number of units purchased in 
period 1. The number of units he can purchase in period 2 is restricted by his money account. 
Figure 2 shows a screenshot from treatment 1. 
(please insert figure 2 about here) 
 
At the end of the experiment, one path in the event tree is chosen randomly by rolling 
a die for each price change. Even numbers mark price increases while odd numbers indicate 
price decreases. The subject’s strategy for the resulting path is played and the total value of 
his monetary units plus the final value of his holdings of the single good is determined. The 
subject is paid this sum (at face value) in Euros. 
To control for sequence effects, we vary the order in which we ask for transaction decisions 1 
to 7. Sequence effects may emerge if a subject is faced with positive (or negative) feedback 
first. Consequently, half of our subjects pass through nodes 1 to 7 in ascending numerical 
order so that decisions after price increases always precede decisions after price decreases. 
For the other half, decisions after price increases succeed decisions after price decreases so 
that the order changes to 1, 3, 2, 7, 6, 5, 4. 
3.2  Different Treatments  
The experimental design so far allows us to test hypotheses 1 and 2. To test hypothe-
ses 3 and 4, we have to change our design in two steps. In our standard treatment discussed 
above, our subjects decide freely in all periods. In a second treatment, which is run with an-
other subject group, we eliminate choice in period 1. Rather than having our subjects decide 
  
 12   how many units to buy, the number of units is assigned by the experimenter. We assign our 
subjects a purchase of 20 units of the single good in period 1, which is the median number of 
units bought by subjects in period 1 of our standard treatment. For periods 2 and 3, subjects 
have to decide independently on their transactions. In a third treatment, which is run with yet 
another subject group, we assign not only the number of units in period 1 but also the number 
of units in period 2, and only ask our subjects for period 3 decisions. Again, all assignments 
are the median values from our standard treatment: Subjects are assigned to purchase 20 units 
in period 1, to sell 10 units in period 2 in the case of a price increase (node 2), and to buy 14 
units in period 2 in the case of a price decrease (node 3). The assignment of choices allows us 
to test whether follow-on purchases and repurchases are driven by standard prospect theory or 
(an extended version including) counterfactual thinking. 
3.3 Questionnaire   
In the second part of the experiment, common to all treatments, we ask our subjects to 
complete a short questionnaire in which we address the investigated patterns and potential 
explanations quite directly. To make sure that our subjects are not influenced by their per-
formance in the first part of the experiment, they have to answer the questionnaire after they 
have given their complete strategy and before the actual path in the event tree and their mone-
tary payoff is determined. A translation of the questionnaire can be found in the appendix. 
3.4 Procedure   
The experiment was conducted in December 2004 at the University of Mannheim. Our 
subjects were 107 male and 38 female students, most of them majoring in economics or busi-
ness administration. Our standard treatment was run with 80 subjects, while 33 and 32 sub-
jects participated in the assigned-choice treatments, respectively. Half of the subjects in each 
  
 13   treatment was assigned to make their decisions in ascending numerical order, while the other 
half was assigned to the alternative sequence specified in section 4.3.1. Our subjects had an 
average age of 23 and have been studying at university for an average of 2.3 years. 
After reading the instructions and before participating in the first part of the experi-
ment, subjects had to answer a short questionnaire on the rules of the game, the price process, 
and probabilities involved to ensure that the procedure was fully understood. If a subject an-
swered one of these questions incorrectly, which happened in only five cases, they were re-
quired to re-read the instructions and to answer the questionnaire a second time before starting 
the experiment. The experiment was conducted in a computer laboratory using a self-made 
software tool programmed in PHP. The average processing time was approximately 45 min-
utes. The average payoff was € 12.60, ranging from € 0 to € 22. The entire experiment was 
conducted in German. A translation of the instructions for the individual choice part of our 
standard treatment (in ascending numerical order) can be found in the appendix. 
 
4 Results   
We expect our subjects to exhibit the follow-on purchase and repurchase patterns dis-
cussed in section 2. We test for these patterns by analyzing similar decision sequences within 
our experimental data set, i.e. purchases preceded by purchases and purchases preceded by 
sales. 
4.1  Definition of Variables  
For analyzing purchase behavior, it is not sufficient to compare the number of follow-
on purchases and repurchases following price increases and decreases. We want to ensure that 
  
 14   results are not driven by monetary constraints, which could prohibit subjects from purchasing 
additional units at higher prices. Hence, similar to standard disposition effect measurements 
(see e.g. Odean 1998), we need to control for the number of purchase opportunities. 
Our procedure is as follows: We analyze every node in the event tree separately and 
count purchases and purchase opportunities. A purchase opportunity is recorded if the subject 
has sufficient experimental money to buy at least one more unit of the single good.
6 A pur-
chase is counted whenever a subject decides to actually acquire units of the good, regardless 
of quantity. Based on the two measures and controlling for different path properties and 
treatments, we then compute follow-on purchase frequencies and repurchase frequencies suc-
ceeding price increases and decreases as the relation between corresponding purchases and 
purchase opportunities. For follow-on purchase frequencies, we count only those purchases 
and purchase opportunities that are preceded by another purchase in the previous node. Simi-
larly, for repurchase frequencies, we focus on transaction decisions that are preceded by a sale 
in the previous period. These frequencies serve as estimates of our subjects’ conditional pur-
chase probabilities. 
While hypotheses 1 and 2 are analyzed using our standard treatment only, we refer to 
treatments 2 and 3 to account for counterfactual thinking. 
4.2  Follow-on Purchase Behavior 
Hypothesis 1 expects individual investors to be more likely to purchase additional 
shares of a stock they already hold in their portfolios if the stock price declines rather than 
                                                 
6   Although subjects are allowed to purchase and sell half a good and smaller quantities, their transactions are 
always in whole numbers. 
  
 15   increases subsequent to a prior purchase. We test this hypothesis by comparing our subjects’ 
purchase behavior between nodes 2 and 3 and nodes 6 and 7 in our standard treatment, i.e. 
treatment 1. Purchases and purchase opportunities at nodes 4 and 5 are not taken into account, 
to ensure that our results are comparable to the assigned-choice treatments 2 and 3.
7 We cal-
culate follow-on purchase frequencies separately for nodes 2 and 6 (following price increases) 
and nodes 3 and 7 (following price decreases) as discussed in section 4.1 and apply a simple 
binomial test on these measures. The first block of table 1 documents the results. 
(please insert table 1 about here) 
 
In line with hypothesis 1, subjects are over 2.5 times as likely (66.67 % vs. 26.23 %) 
to purchase additional units of the good if the price decreased rather than increased succeed-
ing the initial purchase. The difference in follow-on purchase frequencies is highly significant 
(p = 0.0000). While this behavior is not consistent with standard expected utility theory in 
combination with constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion, it coincides with behavioral 
explanations like standard prospect theory or counterfactual thinking. 
A potential shortcoming of our statistical test documented above is that we assume 
every purchase rather than every subject to constitute an independent observation. We per-
form a second, more robust test to verify the effect: First, we limit our data set to those sub-
jects in treatment 1 that exhibit follow-on purchase opportunities both following price in-
creases (at node 2, node 6, or both nodes) and succeeding price decreases (at node 3, node 7, 
or both nodes). In a second step, we determine for each subject whether he used at least one of 
                                                 
7   As subjects in treatment 3, node 2, were assigned to sell, they do not have follow-on purchase opportunities 
at nodes 4 and 5. Nodes 4 and 5 instead provide the opportunity to study repurchase behavior, i.e. purchases 
preceded by a sale in the previous period. See section 4.4.3. 
  
 16   his follow-on purchase opportunities after price increases. Conversely, we record whether the 
subject used at least one of his purchase opportunities following price decreases. We then 
perform a matched-pairs Wilcoxon test on these variables, expecting that those subjects with 
follow-on purchase opportunities both following price increases and decreases are more likely 
to use their opportunities in the second case. Again, the result is highly significant (p = 
0.0000). 15 and 22 subjects use their purchase opportunities in neither or both cases, while 33 
(4) subjects only purchase following price decreases (increases). 
Further validation comes from our subjects’ answers to question 2 of the final ques-
tionnaire: Subjects are told that they purchased one unit of good A and one unit of good B in 
the past and that since the purchase good A increased and good B decreased in value. They 
are asked to indicate whether they prefer to purchase an additional unit of good A or good B. 
While out of 145 subjects only 17 claim to be indifferent, the majority, i.e. 84 of the remain-
ing 128 subjects, prefer to buy an additional unit of good B (65.63 %, p = 0.0003). Subjects 
thus not only act purely intuitively, but also behave consistently if the similarity between the 
two situations becomes salient. 
We want to shed light on the above documented follow-on purchase pattern by inves-
tigating what kind of rationale may be behind our subjects’ behavior. We do so by comparing 
transactions in our standard treatment with transaction behavior in the two assigned-choice 
treatments. While in the standard treatment our subjects have carte blanche at all nodes, deci-
sions in period 1 of treatment 2 and in periods 1 and 2 of treatment 3 are predetermined by the 
experimenter. If our subjects commit some kind of counterfactual thought as discussed in sec-
tion 2, we should expect them to be less susceptible to the follow-on purchase pattern if the 
prior purchase decision has been assigned. We therefore repeat the tests described above with 
  
 17   the two assigned-choice treatments based only on our subjects’ decisions at nodes 2 and 3 of 
treatment 2 and 6 and 7 of treatment 3. The lower part of table 1 provides the results. 
In the assigned-choice treatments, subsequent to a price increase (decrease) subjects 
use their follow-on purchase opportunities in 41.54 % (67.69 %) of all cases. As the differ-
ence between purchase frequencies is significant on a 1 percent level (p = 0.0014) we ascer-
tain that the pattern still emerges if the prior purchase has been assigned. The effect, however, 
unfolds to a smaller extent. While following a price decrease purchase frequencies are almost 
identical across treatments 1, 2, and 3 (p = 0.4434), following a price increase subjects are 
much more likely to purchase additional shares if they are not responsible for the initial pur-
chase decision (p = 0.0160). Consistent with the psychological literature (Roese 1997 and 
Roese and Olson 1995a), our subjects are more strongly affected if purchasing additional 
shares means dealing with an upward counterfactual like “I should have bought more shares 
in the first place. They are so expensive now!”. Upward counterfactuals, in general, are 
documented to evoke counterfactual thinking more easily and to have a stronger impact on 
succeeding behavior than downward counterfactuals (“I am glad that I did not buy so many 
shares in the initial purchase. They are cheaper now!”). While the first case results in strong 
feelings of regret, which exacerbate if the subject actually decides to purchase more shares at 
a higher price, the second case evokes only weak pleasure, which influences subsequent be-
havior only marginally. 
As a robustness check, in the final questionnaire we ask our subjects whether they 
would feel better in situation a or situation b: Subjects are informed that they purchased a 
good in the past. Today they recognize that since the purchase the price of the good has de-
creased. While in situation (a) the subject purchased the good although it was unnecessary, in 
situation (b) the subject bought the good because he urgently needed it. Out of 145 subjects 
  
 18   only 16 are indifferent to the two situations, while of the remaining 129 subjects who stated a 
preference, 97 feel better in situation b (75.19 %). Consistent with their behavior in the ex-
periment and with counterfactual thinking, subjects seem to prefer not to be responsible for an 
ex post wrong decision (p = 0.0000). 
4.3  Repurchase Behavior  
Hypothesis 2 argues that individual investors are more likely to repurchase a stock if 
the stock decreased rather than increased in value subsequent to a prior sale. We stick to 
nodes 4 and 5 for investigating this behavioral pattern to be again comparable to the assigned-
choice treatment 3.
8 Table 2 provides the results. 
(please insert table 2 about here) 
 
The table reveals that, consistent with hypothesis 2, subjects are three times as likely 
(52.50 % vs. 17.50 %) to repurchase units of the good in period 3 if, since the sale in period 2, 
the price of the good has declined rather than increased. The effect is not only economically 
but also statistically highly significant (p = 0.0005). 
In a second test we investigate if the same pattern can be observed on an intra-subject 
basis. We therefore check whether subjects with repurchase opportunities at both nodes 4 and 
5 use their opportunities more often subsequent to a price decrease than following a price in-
crease. A matched-pairs Wilcoxon test reveals robust results (p = 0.0013). While 17 and 5 
subjects use their opportunities in no case or in both cases, 16 and 2 subjects repurchase only 
following price decreases or increases, respectively. 
                                                 
8   In treatment 3, subjects were assigned to sell at node 2 and to purchase at node 3. Hence, only nodes 4 and 5 
provide repurchase opportunities in this treatment. 
  
 19   A final test of hypothesis 2 is based on question 3 of the final questionnaire. We ask 
our subjects whether they prefer to repurchase good A or good B. While both goods were sold 
in the past without realizing gains or losses, good A increased and good B decreased in value 
subsequent to the prior sale. Only 20 out of 145 subjects claim to be indifferent between the 
two repurchase opportunities while 106 of the remaining 125 subjects prefer to repurchase 
good B (84.80 %, p = 0.0000), confirming our previous results. 
We perform the same tests for the assigned-choice treatment 3, i.e. we want to find out 
whether our subjects’ preference for repurchasing units of a good that has declined rather than 
increased in value levels off if the prior sale in period 2 was assigned by the experimenter. 
Our tests are again based on our subjects’ decisions in nodes 4 and 5. Results are reported in 
the bottom part of table 2. While subjects still prefer repurchasing following a price decrease, 
the effect loses its statistical significance (p = 0.1587). This loss in significance is mainly 
driven by our subjects’ increased willingness to repurchase the good following a price in-
crease if the prior selling decision was assigned. Repurchase frequencies following price in-
creases are significantly different between treatments 1 and 3 (p = 0.0074), while they are 
almost equal succeeding price decreases (p = 0.3755). Similar to the follow-on purchase pat-
tern analyzed in section 4.2, our subjects shy away from repurchasing a good they have sold 
for a lower price if they are personally responsible for the sale and thus confronted with a sa-
lient upward counterfactual (“Why did I sell this stock? It increased in value!”). 
A final test is based on our subjects’ answers to question 5. Our subjects are told that 
they sold a good in the past and today realize that, since the sale, the price of the good has 
increased. They are asked to indicate whether they would feel better (a) if they sold the good 
in the past although they did not need to or (b) if they sold the good because they needed the 
money. Out of 145 subjects, 15 state indifference, while 102 of the remaining 130 subjects 
  
 20   claim to feel better in the second situation (78.46 %). As the frequency of answer b is highly 
significant (p = 0.0000), hypothesis 4 receives further support. Whether a good was sold 
freely or under compulsion influences our subjects’ feelings and therefore also impacts their 
transactions. Our subjects seem to prefer not being responsible for an ex-post wrong decision 
and try to avoid the regret coming from an upward counterfactual thought by not considering 
repurchasing a good that went up in value. 
 
5 Conclusion   
Based on an individual choice experiment run with 145 students, we document two 
trading patterns concerning follow-on purchases and repurchases: Our subjects prefer pur-
chasing units of a single good if it, subsequent to an initial purchase (pattern 1) or a prior sale 
(pattern 2), decreased rather than increased in value. Follow-on purchases and repurchases are 
2.5 times and three times as likely following a purchase or sale at a higher price. Our experi-
mental design ensures that these findings cannot simply be explained by belief in mean rever-
sion or superior private information. 
We instead argue that our subjects display characteristics of counterfactual thinking, a 
psychological concept that is documented to affect people’s behavior in everyday life (Kah-
neman and Tversky 1982, Kahneman and Miller 1986). Counterfactual thinking can be de-
scribed as people’s natural tendency to create mental simulations of “what might have been” 
if they decided differently in the past or if certain events in the past did not happen or hap-
pened differently. Repurchasing a good following a prior sale is likely to evoke thoughts of 
having sold fewer units of the good or not having sold the good at all. Purchasing additional 
units of a good subsequent to a purchase in the previous period, correspondingly, causes sub-
  
 21   jects to run a simulation in which they made a larger initial purchase. We believe that subjects 
compare reality with these counterfactuals. If this comparison makes the subject feel good, 
i.e. he would be worse off having previously made another decision, he is more likely to fol-
low-on purchase or repurchase the good in order to make his downward counterfactual more 
salient. If the comparison makes him feel bad, e.g. because the good increased in value subse-
quent to the prior purchase or sale, he refrains from purchasing the good to forget about his 
ex-post wrong decision. 
We control for this counterfactual story with two additional experimental treatments, 
in which we assign subjects to purchase and sell units of the good in previous periods. As-
signment of choices is known to alter mental antecedent controllability, which, in turn, deter-
mines whether subjects are able to create salient counterfactual thoughts (Kahneman and 
Miller 1986, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo 1991, Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and 
McMullen 1995, Roese and Olson 1995a). If they are not responsible for the prior purchasing 
or selling decision, subjects are less prone to the discussed follow-on purchase and repurchase 
patterns. The effect, however, is an asymmetric one: Following a purchase or sale at a higher 
price, subjects purchase additional units or repurchase units of the good in approximately 
60 % of all cases -  regardless of whether the prior purchase or sale was free or assigned. Con-
versely, following a price increase we obtain significant differences in follow-on purchase and 
repurchase frequencies with approximately 20 % in the free choice treatment and 40 % in the 
assigned-choice treatments. Subjects are thus less likely to purchase additional units or to 
repurchase units if they decided freely on the previous purchase or sale and are therefore re-
sponsible for an ex post wrong decision. This, in turn, provides evidence that counterfactual 
thinking affects investment decisions. 
  
 22   Although our results are derived from an experiment using students instead of real in-
vestors and conditional decisions based on a strategy method, we believe that our study con-
tributes to understanding real investors’ transaction behavior: Our students should know at 
least as much about normative theory and optimal investment decisions as most individual 
investors do. If we find that economics students are biased in their transactions by prior ex-
periences and decisions, we expect to see the same or even exacerbated behavior when inves-
tigating less sophisticated decision makers. The strategy method, on the other hand, demands 
that our subjects make conditional decisions. Thinking “what if I incur a loss?” might result in 
decisions other than facing an unconditional real loss. If there were an impact, however, one 
would expect subjects to exhibit less emotion and show weaker reactions to hypothetical 
gains and losses than to real ones, thus weakening all effects and biases. Hence investigating 
these biases using a strategy method provides a conservative test. If we are able to find behav-
iorally motivated trading patterns, we can expect them to be even stronger in reality. 
Further research is required to find out how and when investors think counterfactually 
and how exactly counterfactual thoughts interfere with subsequent investment decisions. 
While in our experiment, subjects, for the sake of simplicity, only traded in one good, one 
could also assume that alternative investment opportunities and their performance serve as 
comparisons for counterfactual thoughts. Understanding counterfactual thinking in the in-
vestment context might lead to better models of how investors form and update their individ-
ual reference points over time and could thereby enhance our understanding of individual bi-
ases and potential market outcomes. 
  
 23   Appendix: Instructions and Questionnaire 
The following subsections contain translations of the German instructions for the stan-
dard treatment, i.e. treatment 1, as well as the final questionnaire. Instructions for treatments 2 
and 3 differed only marginally from treatment 1.  
Instructions for Treatment 1 
You are participating in an experiment conducted by the Chair of Banking and Finance at the 
University of Mannheim. The experiment is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. 
It will take about 45 minutes, including time for reading instructions and completing a short 
questionnaire at the end. Please do not communicate with other participants during the ex-
periment. 
If you read the following instructions carefully, you will be able to earn a considerable 
amount of money. The exact amount depends on the decisions you make. You will be paid in 
cash immediately after the experiment. Please signal us if you have problems understanding 
these instructions. 
In this experiment, you buy and sell units of a fictitious good in three successive periods. Af-
ter each period, the price of the good will change. If it rises, you will make a profit. If it de-
creases, you will incur a loss. 
Period 1 
In Period 1, you receive an initial endowment of € 12. With this money, you can buy up to 40 
units of the fictitious good. Each unit of the good costs exactly 30 cents in period 1. After you 
have made your decision, the price of the good will change. It will either increase by 12 cents 
(to 42 cents) or decrease by 10 cents (to 20 cents). Both price changes are equally likely. 
  
 24   Period 2 
In period 2, you can either sell units of the good at the new price, i.e. 42 cents in case of a 
price increase and 20 cents in case of a price decrease (as long as you have bought any units 
in period 1), buy additional units of the good (as long as you still have enough money), or do 
nothing. Subsequent to your decision, the price will once again rise by 12 cents or decrease by 
10 cents. Both price changes are equally likely and independent of the previous price change. 
Period 3 
As in period 2, you can either buy or sell units of the good in period 3, or do nothing. After-
wards, the price of the good will change for the final time. Price increases (by 12 cents) and 
decreases (by 10 cents) are again equally likely and independent of all preceding price 
changes. 
Therefore, over all periods, the price can change as shown in the attached figure. 
(A figure similar to figure 1 was attached.) 
The figures at the “nodes” of the “tree” represent probabilities. As price increases and price 
decreases are equally likely, the probabilities are always 50 %. 
Whether the price of the good increases or decreases at the end of periods 1, 2, and 3 will be 
determined at the end of the experiment. For each price change a die is rolled. 
As you do not know how prices will change during the experiment, we ask you to disclose 
your decisions for all possible price developments. You have to decide on how many units to 
buy or sell at the current price at each of the nodes in the attached figure (numbered 1 to 7 and 
marked in blue). Therefore, you have to make seven decisions. 
  
 25   Subsequent to the experiment, a die will be rolled three times to determine whether the price 
rises or decreases in periods 1, 2, and 3. If an even number is rolled, the price increases by 12 
cents; if an odd number is rolled, the price decreases by 10 cents. 
Example: You throw the die three times in a row and obtain 3, 6, and 4. This means the price 
decreases in period 1 and increases in periods 2 and 3. In this case, only your decisions at 
nodes 1, 3, and 6 are relevant for your financial payout (see the attached figure).  
(A figure similar to figure 1 was attached; nodes 1, 3, and 6 were highlighted in red.) 
Your financial payoff is equivalent to the total value of your goods at the end of the experi-
ment plus your cash on hand. Your cash on hand is equivalent to the € 12 which you received 
in period 1, minus your expenditure for buying units of the good, plus your revenues from 
selling units. You are paid your financial reward in cash at the end of the experiment. 
Questionnaire  
What did you think when making your decisions in the experiment? 
(This was an open question.) 
 
In the past, you purchased a unit of good A and a unit of good B. Since you purchased the 
goods, the price of good A has increased and the price of good B has decreased. Today, you 
purchase another unit of one of these goods. Of which of the two goods would you prefer to 
purchase an additional unit? 
ο     I would prefer to purchase another unit of good A. 
ο     I would prefer to purchase another unit of good B. 
ο     I would be indifferent between purchasing another unit of good A or good B. 
  
 26   In the past, you sold two different goods, A and B. You made neither gains nor losses with 
these sales. Since you sold the goods, the price of good A has increased and the price of good 
B has decreased. Today, you repurchase one of these goods. Which of the two goods would 
you prefer to repurchase? 
ο     I would prefer to repurchase good A. 
ο     I would prefer to repurchase good B. 
ο     I would be indifferent between repurchasing good A or good B. 
In the past, you purchased a good. Today, you find out that, since the purchase, the price of 
the good has decreased. Please distinguish between two different situations: 
(a)   You purchased the good although you did not need to. It was your free choice.  
(b)   You purchased the good because you urgently needed it. You did not have any 
other choice.  
 
In which situation would you feel better? 
ο     I would feel better in (a). 
ο     I would feel better in (b). 
ο     I would feel the same in (a) and (b). 
  
 27   In the past, you sold a good. Today, you find out that, since the sale, the price of the good has 
increased. Please distinguish between two different situations: 
(a)   You sold the good although you did not need to. It was your free choice.  
(b)    You sold the good because you needed the money. You did not have any other   
choice. 
 
In which situation would you feel better? 
ο     I would feel better in (a). 
ο     I would feel better in (b). 
ο     I would feel the same in (a) and (b). 
  
 28    Figure 1: Event tree of price changes 
The event tree shows all possible price developments over periods 1 to 4. In period 1, the single good starts at a 
price of 30 cents. At the end of each period, the price either increases by 12 cents or decreases by 10 cents. Price 














































































 29   Figure 2: Computer screen 
The figure shows a translation of the computer screen. The graph area displays the event tree, with the current 
node highlighted in red. On the left-hand side, subjects are informed about their current situation. Subjects could 
decide whether they want to purchase, to sell, or to do nothing by clicking on buttons below the graph area. The 




 30   Table 1: Follow-on purchases and counterfactual thinking 
The following table is based on our subjects’ decisions in period 2, nodes 2 and 3, and period 3, nodes 6 and 7. It 
reports the number of purchase opportunities, the number of purchases, and resulting purchase frequencies fol-
lowing a price increase (nodes 2 and 6) or decrease (nodes 3 and 7). The first block is based on treatment 1 and 
documents statistics for all follow-on purchase opportunities, i.e. purchases with a purchase in the preceding 
period (nodes 1 and 3, respectively). The second block documents follow-on purchases and follow-on purchase 
opportunities in nodes 2 and 3 of treatment 2 and nodes 6 and 7 of treatment 3, i.e. following an assigned pur-
chase in period 1, node 1, or period 2, node 3, respectively. P-values in the last column are based on binomial 








frequency  p 
following price 
increase  122 32  26.23  %  Treatment 1 with  
purchase in preceding  
period  following price 
decrease  123 82  66.67  % 
0.0000 
following price 
increase  65 27  41.54  %  Treatments 2 and 3 with 
assigned purchase in  
preceding period  following price 





Table 2: Repurchases and counterfactual thinking 
The following table is based on our subjects’ decisions in period 3, nodes 4 and 5 only. It reports the number of 
purchase opportunities, the number of purchases, and resulting purchase frequencies following a price increase 
(node 4) or decrease (node 5). The first block is based on treatment 1 and documents statistics for all repurchase 
opportunities, i.e. purchases with a sale in the preceding period (node 2). The second block documents repur-
chases and repurchase opportunities in nodes 4 and 5 of treatment 3, i.e. following an assigned purchase in pe-
riod 1, node 1, and an assigned sale in period 2, node 2. P-values in the last column are based on binomial tests 








frequency  p 
following price 
increase  40 7  17.50  % 
Treatment 1 with sale 
in preceding period  following price 
decrease  40 21  52.50  % 
0.0005 
following price 
increase  32 14  43.75  % 
Treatment 3 with assigned 
sale in preceding period  following price 
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